Mongolia prefers to detour through Russia rather than sell coal to India from Chinese ports.

Mongolia, a vast land rich in resources, has become an inland country surrounded by China and Russia due to its unique geographical position.

Despite its abundant coal, copper, and rare earth resources, Mongolia faces many restrictions when exporting.

Recently, India has shown a strong interest in Mongolia's coking coal, and Mongolia hopes to explore new markets to reduce its dependence on China. As a result, both sides have decided to cooperate and attempt to create an attractive project.

However, a question arises: how to transport these resources effectively to India?

Looking at the map, the shortest route from Mongolia to India passes through China.

Yet, transporting through China necessitates toll payments, which undoubtedly complicates matters for India.

The China-India relationship is already complex, and India is actively seeking to "de-China-ize"; how can it allow China to profit in the middle?

Consequently, India proposed two indirect transportation options.

The first route is via the Russian Far East, where Mongolia would transport coal and copper to Vladivostok, and then ship it to Chennai, India, by sea.

Although this route is long, it is extremely costly, practically tailored for "wealthy buyers."

The second option is through the "International North-South Transport Corridor," where Mongolia would transport resources overland to Russia, then south through Central Asian countries to reach Chabahar port in Iran, before finally shipping to India.

While this route is slightly shorter than the first, it involves multiple countries, making procedures complicated and time-consuming.

Overall, both routes embody a strategy of "spending money for peace of mind," with evident political considerations.

However, India is not simply a buyer.

Prime Minister Modi is highly sensitive to pricing, and whether these high-cost routes will receive approval remains uncertain.

In contrast to India's motives, Mongolia's considerations are more complex.

On one hand, due to reduced coal imports from China, Mongolia urgently needs to develop new markets, with India being an ideal target.

On the other hand, Mongolia has long sought to implement a "Third Neighbor" strategy to reduce its dependence on China and Russia, enhancing its international status.

Thus, in this collaboration with India, Mongolia hopes to develop India into a transit hub for resources, allowing it to send its resources to countries like the U.S. and South Korea, thereby increasing its international presence.

In other words, Mongolia aims for a dual benefit: to profit while boosting its political influence.

But will this strategy succeed?

As a major energy importer, it remains uncertain whether India can absorb Mongolia's resources.

Even if India has this demand, the transfer of resources requires China's tacit approval.

After all, Mongolia's exported rare earth resources are crucial for modern technology and military applications. If exported in large quantities to the U.S., China's strategic security would be directly threatened, potentially leading Mongolia to "suffer the consequences."

China will not stand idly by regarding interactions between Mongolia and India.

China maintains an open attitude, encouraging Mongolia to participate in the "Belt and Road" initiative and share development opportunities because a stable and prosperous Mongolia aligns with China's strategic interests.

Simultaneously, China has clearly stated that any country seeking to undermine Chinese interests while trying to profit from regional affairs is unacceptable.

China-Mongolia relations are close, with deep cooperation in trade and culture, but the "friendship boat" cannot capsize easily.

If Mongolia insists on "taking sides" and undermines China's core interests, China will not hold back.

The essence of international relations is a game of interests.

Mongolia and India's strategies may seem savvy but are, in fact, shortsighted.

In this globalized era of "you are in me, and I am in you," cooperation and win-win outcomes are the only paths forward; any attempts to "benefit at the expense of neighbors" will ultimately backfire.

On the surface, India worries about China's "chokehold," while Mongolia seeks resource export diversification, but more complex considerations may lie beneath.

India views China as a "hypothetical enemy," continuously seeking to weaken its influence; attracting Mongolia undoubtedly aims to create trouble in China's "backyard."

Meanwhile, Mongolia navigates between China and Russia, attempting to seek maximum benefits in the great power game, seemingly overlooking that China is its largest trading partner, with a high level of economic dependence.

Take Tianjin Port as an example, which was originally a "golden channel" for Mongolia's coal exports.

Through Tianjin, Mongolia could export coal efficiently and cost-effectively to the world.

Now, Mongolia has chosen to abandon this convenience in pursuit of more distant transport routes, which seems to be "seeking distance at the expense of proximity."

Fundamentally, this results from India's geopolitical considerations and Mongolia's "great power balancing" mindset, leading them to ignore basic economic principles.

In fact, India has made considerable efforts to woo Mongolia.

Not only has it promised to buy coal but also plans to invest in infrastructure in Mongolia to support its economic development.

Prime Minister Modi even stated that India is willing to become Mongolia's "third neighbor," providing comprehensive support.

Will this series of "sugar-coated bullets" sway Mongolia? Currently, it seems Mongolia is wavering.

On one hand, Mongolia is highly dependent on China, economically constrained by it;

on the other hand, Mongolia is also concerned that excessive reliance could harm its interests, thus seeking to introduce external forces like India to balance China's influence.

However, Mongolia may underestimate India's "ambitions."

India views South Asia as its sphere of influence, intolerant of any challenges; if Mongolia truly "aligns" with India, it may become India's "pawn," used to counter China.

At that point, Mongolia would not only fail to achieve its "third neighbor" goal but also find itself in greater difficulty.

China has repeatedly expressed respect for Mongolia's sovereignty and independence, welcoming its friendly cooperative relations with other countries, but this does not mean China will overlook Mongolia's "small moves."

As the saying goes, "A cornered rabbit will bite," if Mongolia genuinely undermines China's core interests, China will not rule out taking necessary measures to protect its rights.

After all, China is no longer a weak country that can be bullied.

China not only has the strength and determination to defend its interests but also hopes to maintain friendly cooperation with Mongolia for mutual development and win-win outcomes.

However, if someone attempts to "benefit at the expense of neighbors," China will also not be courteous.

The interaction between Mongolia and India reflects the complexity and variability of today's international landscape.

With China's rise, global power dynamics are being reshuffled, and certain countries inevitably feel anxious, attempting to safeguard their interests through alliances.

However, history has shown that any approach to achieving security through "zero-sum games" is futile; only by adhering to cooperation and win-win outcomes can common development be realized.